BILLY BUDD
A BARNARDIAN APPROACH TO A MORALLY RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT

*O**rganizations, as conceived by Chester Barnard, enable its employees to be morally responsible, because such organizations are essentially dependent on the cooperation of free, moral, and competent individuals. Our analysis of Melville's Billy Budd illustrates how a Barnardian organization might have prevented the unjust execution of Billy and in the process enhanced organizational effectiveness and efficiency.*

Keywords: organization, moral responsibility, individual, authority, executive, common good

With no power to annul the elemental evil in him…apprehending the good, but powerless to be it; a nature like Claggart's surcharged with energy…what recourse is left to it but to recoil upon itself and like the scorpion for which the Creator alone is responsible, and act out to the end the part allotted to it.

Herman Melville, p.324

I.   Introduction

By focusing on the conflict between Billy Budd and Claggart and Captain Vere's inability to deal with it, except in an especially narrow and precipitous legal-coercive way, scholars have failed to see a central theme of the novel: how human organizations may mitigate the consequences of individual failings or inadequacies. From this perspective the question is not, 'how can innocence or goodness prevail over evil?'   Nor is the question is, 'how can injustice be avoided?'   The question rather is, 'are there organizational resources which can prevent injustice, while at the same time enhance the fulfilling of organizational objectives?'   Framing the question in this way illuminates the inadequacy of 'moralist' and 'legalist' analyses of *Billy Budd*.   We propose an alternative interpretation of the novel, which is more faithful to Melville's intentions and which provides insight into the positive possibilities of organizational life. These we summarize as a 'Barnardian Organization.'

Before we begin our social scientific analysis, we wish to make a methodological point regarding our use of fiction as 'data.' Famously, Aristotle said that poetry is more serious than history. What he meant is that poetry is more philosophically true than facts or, what is less, *historically* rendered facts. We will try to illustrate the truth of this view by our analysis of *Billy Budd*. Fiction has a critical and overwhelming advantage over 'fact/information,' when it comes to understanding the motivations of human action. The author can reveal not only what the character did more fully than a historical record but why he did it. In this case the author supplies 'the facts,' which include the entire existential context of the novel. The historian only supplies interpretations of the 'facts,' which *per force* center on events often selected in an undisclosed manner. Fiction can give a fuller and truer account of human actions in its existential context than all but the rarest historical narratives. Of course, great literature seldom reduces itself to simple or single explanations, even when the author tries to do so. His/her art trumps intentions. The reader always has the opportunity to decide what the meaning of the work is for the reader. Nevertheless, the advantage of the fiction writer remains great. He/she does not select the facts in the manner of a historian; but recounts them. His/her facts are complete and true, the state of affairs that historians can only aspire to. Not only does Melville give us convincing portraits of his main characters, by so doing he makes us (or allows or leads us to infer) some critical insights into the motivations of these individuals but also into the nature of organizational life and its possibilities.

[Billy's] crime…is his very innocence…the obvious innocence of the accusation

leveled against him and, more relevant to his fate, his innocence to the existence of evil…. Billy's stutter is… the impediment that allows for violence to substitute itself for speaking. Eugene Goodheart, p.82

II.   *Billy Budd*: a Layered Plot

Let us deal with the story of *Billy Budd* in an unorthodox way. Our justification is that our purpose is not literary criticism but social scientific analysis. *Billy Budd* is far more than a tragic tale of the conflict between good and evil. It uses its Manichean backdrop to suggest a way to avoid the conflict or, at the very least, to mitigate its tragic effects. It is not a child's tale of Good Billy and against Evil Claggart. Like many great writers, Melville suggests ways out of existential dilemmas of which he may not have been fully aware. *Billy Budd* is a story of human failure on many levels. Nevertheless, these failures suggest that they were not inevitable, that events once begun did not have to culminate in Billy's execution. We wish to understand the text from a perspective which illuminates the relationship of leadership and organizational effectiveness and in the process suggests how moral responsibility is intrinsic to its success. We begin by revealing the plot of *Billy Budd* in layers.

Iteration One: Billy, a foretopman, strikes Claggart, the Master-at-Arms, killing him. Captain Vere, who witnessed the assault, convenes a Drum-Head Court, a secret trial, which condemns Billy to death. Due process was served, at least arguably, but was justice?

Iteration Two: Billy is falsely accused of fomenting a mutiny, a charge which no one believed, including Vere. Due to a speech impediment, which flowers when under emotional stress, Billy responds with a blow instead of a verbal denial of the charge. So provoked and so impeded, the officers of the Drum Head do not believe that Billy is guilty of murder, because they do not believe he is capable of contemplating, much less planning, mutiny. They urge, in various way and for various reasons, delay in the trial and sentencing. Vere alone demurs. Billy is tried and executed. Due process was served, but was justice?

Iteration Three: From the time that Billy was taken off *the Rights of Man*, a merchant ship, and impressed on the *HMS Indomitable*, a British man-of-war, he had a beneficial effect on the crew. He is a 'Handsome Sailor,' a kind of charismatic being, with no official status, who induces behavioral changes in all he meets. Billy's charisma, along with his unsurpassed skills as a foretopman, arouses Claggart's envy and hatred. He conspires to frame Billy for mutiny, taking advantage of the nervousness of the British navy due to prior mutinies which occurred during the war with the French. Dansker, an experienced seaman, aware of the conspiracy, warns an incredulous Billy, but takes no further action. When Claggart accuses Billy in front of the Captain, Billy strikes him, an act for which he is condemned to death. Due process was served, but was justice?

We could go on with these iterations, adding more and more details and nuances. We think, however, the point has been made. With each iteration, Billy's guilt seems more doubtful or troubling. For more than a hundred years, readers have longed for better outcomes, if not happy endings. An examination of the raw elements of the plot supports the allegation that a crime has been committed. A man died, as a result of a blow, which was 'caused' by an accusation, which however false, was not sufficient to justify a homicidal response. By any measure, Billy committed a wrongful act. In the absence of a viable alternative, all our successive iterations can be reasonable held to support a guilty verdict. At most, they support some form of mitigation of the sentence. Due process was served and from the point of view of positive law during a time of war, justice was also served. Billy killed a superior officer. There was a genuine concern regarding recent mutinies, which had been harshly put down. Captain Vere acted quickly and decisively to forestall a mutiny or the possibility of mutiny. Mutiny did not occur. Therefore, the Captain not only acted within the rules, he acted in the best possible manner under the circumstances. Executing Billy was just and necessary.

Our only problem with this finding is that we believe there was a viable alternative that not only would have spared Billy but would have improved the organizational effectiveness of the warship. Captain Vere's inability to see this alternative was a fundamental failure of leadership, a failure that inevitably would have compromised the warship's mission. The rest of this essay explains why.

> There are, admittedly, rules of strict liability in modern law under which people
> can be held criminally liable not only for outcomes they did not intend…but in
> some cases for outcomes they did not even cause. Thus employers can be
> sanctioned for breaches of rules that their employees have committed against their
> intentions. Bernard Williams, p.57

III.   The Heroic Self: Responsibility without Intent or Knowledge

In our discussion of *Billy Budd* so far, we have suggested, along with many other scholars, that his trial and execution may have met the standards of due process, but did not seem just. In other words, we separated the idea of a valid or defensible outcome of due process from the idea of justice, which seems to involve a great deal more than a proper application of law. Here, by accepting the separation of law and justice, we open the door to moral responsibility beyond legal strictures.   We employ an analysis that holds the accused to a *higher* standard than criminal or civil law applied with due process. Instead of saying that Billy was unjustly executed, because Vere adopted a too narrow view of his duty and a too precipitous application of a judicial proceeding, in the light of all the circumstances of delivering the fatal blow, we allow for the possibility that Billy was morally responsible for the death of Claggart, even if another more nuanced and subtle, judicial proceeding would have exonerated him.

We rely on the Bernard Williams to clarify our points. He believes that the employment of criminal law's assumptions of knowledge and intent are much too restrictive to deal with the larger notions of moral responsibility. Because 'wrongs' exist which do not fit the standards of a crime, he argues that a standard suitable to criminal conviction would leave out much too many acts for the concept of moral responsibility to apply or indeed for society to continue in a civilized manner.

The conception of modern morality, however, insists at once on the primacy of guilt, its significance turning us toward victims, and its rational restriction to the voluntary. It is   under considerable strain in insisting on all these things at once. In fact, if we want to   understand why it might be important for us to distinguish the harms we do voluntarily   from those we do involuntarily, we shall hope to succeed only if we ask what kind of failing or inadequacy are the source of the harms, and what those failings mean in the   context of our own and other people's lives. This is the territory of shame…
[Williams, p.94].

The next section applies the same distinction in an effort to apply moral responsibility to organizations; here we deal with individuals.

To appreciate Williams's reasoning within the compass of this essay, the example of Ajax is useful. As a hero Ajax lives (or is spawned by) his heroic acts. Ajax's willed acts will Ajax into existence. The heroic act of Ajax's willing, in both senses, create Ajax, enabling us and Ajax to unconceal of himself. Responding to the unjust allocation of Achilleus's armor, Ajax acted shamefully, actions which amounted to a willful self-denial of Ajax the Hero, of Ajax who *is* his heroic deeds and who by self-definition cannot commit shameful acts.

Ajax wakes up and shows that he has recovered his mind. There is a passionate lyric   outburst of despair and, above all, shame: he has made himself, apart from anything else,   utterly absurd. It becomes increasingly clear to him that he can only kill himself. He knows that he cannot change his *ethos*, his character, and he knows that after what he has   done, this grotesque humiliation, he cannot live the only kind of life his *ethos* demands   [Williams, p.72-3].

The injustice of Agamemnon's decision diminishes Ajax, for it asserts that a lesser hero is the greater, Ajax must set things right, for he cannot be Ajax and accept his diminution. To accept the allocation makes him an unwilling person, leaving him as a willed subject, acted upon merely and solely. Athena reinforces his abject status, by making it clear to all that Ajax has been willed, acted upon, by her superior willingness or will to power. Worse, by intoxicating him, she causes (wills) him to act in a shameful manner, a process

which undermines further Ajax's self-conception and self-creation. Is Athena *Parthenos* making another point as well? First, Ajax is the object of her will. Second, he is willed to act anti-heroically, becoming anti-Ajax. It matters not in the least that the god, Athena, has superior will. Her divine power is heroically irrelevant *to Ajax*. Heroes overcome their adversaries, human or divine, or they lose their status, their self-conception, themselves. It they cannot overcome being willed upon, they cannot be self-conceived, self-willed, self-willing. Life as a willed creature cannot be countenanced, much less tolerated, by a hero. If a hero cannot conceive (create) himself, by his willing actions, he cannot conceive (imagine) his existence. Ajax kills himself, his willing act, an effort to expunge Ajax the willed upon.   Suicide is his ultimate assertion or reassertion of his self-conception. Ajax *Parthenos*.

As many might object, the standards of an ancient warrior society, *a fortiori*, one which applies to only the greatest heroes will have limited application in a discussion of moral responsibility in a modern society. And of course Williams makes no such claim. His object is to shed light on the inadequacy of contemporary moral philosophy. We employ Williams as authority for demonstrating the necessity for separating the idea of moral responsibility from criminal due process. The question that we ask is this: assuming that Ajax acted justly, that is, his suicide reflected his moral responsibility for his shameful acts, notwithstanding that he was acting under blinded by a powerful god and therefore acted in ignorance; can such a standard be applied to the employees of an organization? Williams moves us in this direction by postulating a self which is neither a self-creating hero like Ajax nor an atomized individual.

If we think, plausibly enough, that the power of reason is not enough by itself to   distinguish   good and bad; if we think, even more plausibly, that even if it is, it is not very   good   at   making   its   effects indubitably obvious, then we should hope that there is some   limit   to   these   people's   autonomy,   that there is an *internalized other* in them that carries   some genuine social weight [Williams, p.100, emphasis supplied].

Williams is not referencing an organization employee, however, since a great deal of 'society' is conducted within organizational settings, it is no stretch to allow the 'internalized other' to have an organizational source. This is precisely what the Barnardian organization entails. Before we turn to Barnard, we need to consider another way to hold individuals and their organizations morally responsible.

Within our collective imagination, evidently, bureaucracy and natural law are antithetical to each other; otherwise, Kafka's [*the Trial*] imagery would not seem so perfectly appropriate. David Luban, *et al*, p.2350

IV.   Organization's Man: the Hierarchical and Epistemological Excuses

Luban *et al* make a seemingly powerful case that something like 'moral responsibility' can be and must be applied to organizations? Let us examine their arguments. Although, like Williams, they make a case for the separation of moral responsibility from the criteria of criminal due process and to a more limited extent to the law of torts, we do not believe they have established the case for holding 'the organization,' in the persons of its employees, liable for wrongdoing. Our reason is simply that they have misconstrued the nature of an organization. They hypostasize 'organization' into an abstraction which acts according to its own logic, independent of human control, a kind of *2001* Hal. 'Organizations are real and irreducible to their component individuals'[Luban, *et al,* p.2377]. No human is responsible. No human knows what is going on.   Naturally, in their efforts to make emploees morally responsible, Luban *et al* deny this implication. Yet it is difficult to see, since they implicitly deny that an organization can be beneficial, that is, *increase* the moral responsibility of employees, how this can be done. They offer some suggestions out

of this self-imposed, and in our view, unnecessary, dilemma, the inadequacy of which we discuss below. Here, consider why organizations can have baleful influence on the moral sensibilities of all of us who are less than heroic:

> In sum, we have identified three distinct reasons that the organization must be taken seriously in our practices of fixing blame and attributing responsibility. First, the corporate structure may be a locus of events causally relevant to morally significant harm. Second, organizational culture may serve as both a causal locus for harm and an object of moral condemnation. Third, as individual's participation in organizational activity involves special risks and imposes special obligations, factors that may deepen responsibility for unintended and inadvertent wrongs [Luban, *et al*, p.2377]

Not everyone agrees in the inherent malignity of organizations. James Madison, for example, argues in *Federalist* #10 : 'Councils against any danger from that source[individual selfishness]…will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union, than a particular member of it' [Madison, p.65]. The organized group is or can be, in other words, more reasonable and moderate than a given individual. Far from oppressing an individual or blunting moral sensibilities, a *properly* structured organization can optimize liberty and moral responsibility. The entire *Federalist* was an effort to describe such a structure at the governmental level. Nothing in it precludes application to a complex organization. In our analysis of Barnard we will hear the echoes of Madison, as well as, Aristotle.

Luban *et al's*, examples loaded as they are, it seems to us, indicate the depth of their misconception. Moreover, their mistake, apart from compromising their argument, lets the human components of the organization off the hook—precisely what they are trying to avoid—except as employees might be rewarded by an organization about to be punished or penalized financially. This is an inevitable consequence of pitting the organizations against individuals. If the 'organization' acts—assuming that a mental construct can act—according to its own logic, by limiting individual choice and blunting moral sensibility, on what grounds can its employees be held accountable? Luban *et al*, in effect, counter: by accepting employment, in a 'Luban *et al* organization,' individuals have a given tacit consent to organizational values and objectives which can never be under their control. 'Thus, for example, if an SS officer claimed that he did not know of ther SS's murderous activities, we may wish to insist that his ignorance is blameworthy' [Luban, *et al*, p.2382-3].   The 'may wish' masks their manifest desire to punish, for' [employees] 'must look and listen for evil and attempt to thwart it if they discover it' [Luban, *et al*, p.2383]. The heroes of the *Iliad* have now been transformed into knight errants, Don Quixotes in a world of Sancho Panzas. All they can do, short of attacking windmills at much greater peril, is quit, a decision which raises ethical problems by itself [Hirschman]. For example, would quitting make matters better or worse for others in the organization? Or, is there a chance by that staying misconduct can be ameliorated? Luban *et al* suggest affirmative answers themselves, because they believe that if employees adhere to their 'obligations,' discussed below, the organization might respond in a less morally egregious matter. Our problem with their set of 'obligations' is that we do not see how organizations, especially their exemplars, would respond positively, should organizational objectives be compromised. But we anticipate.

Let us examine the 'defenses' which exercise Luban *et al* using their examples. First, consider Nazi concentration camps in a different way from how Luban *et al* employ the Nazi regime to make *our* point. Instead of the SS, let us consider the *Judenrat*e, the Jewish officials who 'collaborated' or, if you prefer, 'cooperated,' with the Nazis. By Luban *et al's* standards, can they be held accountable as Nazi 'collaborators?' Or, can they properly claim that they were mitigating the suffering of Jews, because they were more sympathetic than the Nazis?   Or, can they claim that the camps operated according to the logic

of a 'Luban *et al* organization,' and therefore their actions were not morally accountable, to say nothing of being subject to a war crimes tribunal? Clearly the 'epistemological' excuse cannot apply. Everyone knew, the *Judenrate* most of all, what the consequences of 'transportation east' were. Their only defense is that they were 'following orders,' *albeit* under duress.

Luban *et al* dismiss the 'following orders' defense out of hand, offering as authority the declarations of the Nuremburg tribunal: They quote with approval the declaration of Article 8 of the Nuremburg Charter specifically provided that 'the fact that the defendant acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility' [Luban *et al*, p.2351]. Leaving aside the dubious practice of declaring a new liability or responsibility without argumentation, we have several difficulties with a declaration, which amounts to a call to heroism or treason, from the comfort of a law office or judicial chambers in a constitutional polity. The first is the absurdity of *compelling* a person to be heroic under pain of facing a war crimes tribunal conducted by the victorious enemies of one's nation-state. The putative defier of 'lawful' orders is thus given a Hobbesian choice: to suffer punishment under his current regime or be convicted in a court which might come into existence upon the defeat of his/her nation. Either imperative, moreover, denies the fundamental basis of heroic choice outlined above in our discussion of Ajax. Heroes adhere to a code they have internalized, not one they conform to under external pressure. To postulate heroic responses as a general way to transcend positive law in organizations, defined as antithetical to human values or the common good, seems unrealistic in the extreme. In addition, it ignores the costs of heroism to innocent associates, most aptly, the wives and children of putative heroes, as Ajax's wife makes plain in futile arguments against his suicide. Heroes impose the consequences of heroism on many others almost inevitably, as even warrior cultures admit and regret. See Achilles or Hector in the *Iliad*. Moreover, as we argue in our analysis of a Barnardian organization, heroes, with few exceptions, are 'unfitted for cooperation.' Thus, Barnard expounds, are most ordinary people.

Our second difficulty with dismissing the 'following orders' defense concerns the basis of 'natural law:' 'Propositions of natural law impose constraints on precepts of positive law: if a precept of positive law is not constituted to promote the common good, it lacks legitimacy—it is not law…. [It] implies a moral relationship between those who govern and those who are governed' [Luban *et al*, p.2350]. They define 'natural law' as 'the common good,' so powerfully understood that it denies legal status to properly passed legislation or judicial verdicts. The not 'legitimate law' concept requires an individual to defy positive law, under the threat of running afoul of a war crimes tribunal. Supposing that 'natural law' is valid, which seems problematic at best, its content is unlikely to achieve consensus. What makes matters worse is that the leading exponents of natural law, or some variant which transcends positive law, when they have had political power, have employed it as an 'ideal,' however dubious it may seem to the uninitiated, with which to justify the murder, torture, or oppression of millions. Consider the genocide that Yahweh extols in several books of the Hebrew Bible [Dawson]. Consider the' natural law,' which operates under divine authority, doctrines of the medieval Church [Kern]. Consider 'divine right of kings,' based on the *birth* of kings [Kantorowitz]. Consider the 'natural' or 'scientific' materialism of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao [Pinker]. Consider the racist doctrines of the Hitler Movement [Vasillopulos, *Triumph*]. All these regimes discounted, if they did not annihilate, positive law in the name of a transcendent 'common good,' 'naturally' and 'spiritually' reinforced, often in pursuit of 'eternal values' or God's Will. All these regimes received the support of their nations' leading intellectuals, like Heidegger, Schmitt and Mann for the Nazi Era, to say nothing of desperate masses [Vasillopulos, *Triumph*]. By no means does this dreary record of 'natural law' demonstrate that it can *never* be applied beneficially. Nor does it demonstrate that positive law can be *sufficient* to a just and decent society. It is to say that dismissing the 'following orders' defense in the name of 'natural law' without paying attention to human experience with the doctrine is fatuous.

Let us reinforce the point with Luban *et al's* example. How would their dismissal of 'following orders' defense apply to Jewish 'collaborators' in the camps, that is, the many Jews who operated the camps on a day to day basis? Could they be held morally responsible, *albeit* to a lesser degree than the SS, whom Luban *et al* believe fully culpable under their doctrine of natural law? 'We may therefore hold individuals responsible for joining the organization in the first place, as we might hold an individual German responsible for joining the SS' [Luban *et al*, p. 2384]. Of course, Jews were under duress. But were not Germans, especially soldiers who had to swear a personal oath of allegiance to Hitler, instigated by the General Staff, under duress [Vasillopulos, *Triumph*]? Who is free in a totalitarian police state? Of course, the Ajax remedy is open to all, but its application has to be rare, as indeed it proved in the camps [Levi]. Our point is not to condemn the unfortunates who were subject to Nazi coercion; but to suggest the inadequacy of Luban *et al's* remedy to the difficulties of applying standards of moral responsibility within the context of modern organizations. By using the Nazi example, they seem to be holding its 'employees,' the SS, to the same standard of employees of an ordinary organization whose object is to make money and cannot coerce its employees with anything close to the application of violence in the Nazi state. We believe the duress argument applies with more force to soldiers in Nazi Germany than to employees of an ordinary organization, especially as defined by Luban *et al*. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of the SS erodes many distinctions that most notions of justice or morality would wish to keep intact. The 'following orders' defense is often combined with the 'epistemological' defense, defined as, 'I did not know what was or what was going to happen.' **'**Natural law theories have functioned in the 20th century to strip away the positive excuse for official wrongdoing. This will be a hollow triumph, however, if in the end official malefactors may fall back on the epistemological excuse' [Luban *et al*, p.2354]. Let us assume as an *absolute* defense 'epistemology' is flawed. Surely, it can have *some* application even in the extreme case of an SS volunteer. Many Germans joined the SS as very young men, having served for years in Hitler Youth and educated in Nazi schools. Many of them never saw the inside of a concentration camp. Many believed that the ideals of the SS were similar to those of the Jesuit Order, which was Himmler's model for personnel selection and organizational structure [Vasillopulos, *Triumph*]. This defense applies least to those SS who volunteered for duty in the camps. What about the varying culpability, if any, between officers and men, high ranking officers or particularly brutal enlisted men? Luban *et al* never mention the capos, who bought each fifteen minutes of their lives by beating fellow Jews to death. Were they under the obligation to 'thwart evil?'

At all events, to delegitimize positive law in the name of 'ideals,' like the 'common good'remains problematic, wholly dependent on achieving consensus on the content of natural law. Even then, the implied prescription of heroic resistance, that is to disobey orders in the face of cruel punishment, would have to be generally applicable and realistic for it to provide a meaningful restraint on the camps horrific operations. And in the Nazi case, all this would have to be done during a war of survival, surrounded by enemies who were employing many techniques that they themselves declared war crimes after they were victorious [Baker].

Luban *et al* pay silent tribute to the inadequacy of the 'heroic resistance' model by their positing intra-organizational structure which putatively protect employees who learn that their organization is acting immorally. There are (1) individual obligations of investigation: to find out what they are doing in the organization and in general what the organization does; (2) obligations of communication: to others in the organization; (3) obligations of protection: of subordinates; (4) obligations of prevention: structures that would help avoid problems; (5) of precaution: assess organization before joining [Luban *et al*, p.2384]

These 'obligations' seem totally inadequate to the problem as they pose, although it is difficult to find fault with their intentions, the protection is febrile. We will discuss how these obligations might have prevented the tragedy of the *HMS Indomitable* in a later section. First, however, we need to describe the kind or organization, we believe, necessary for these obligations to have a chance of being instituted and effective.

> Cooperation and organization…are *concrete syntheses* of opposed facts, and of opposed thought and emotions of human beings. It is precisely the function of the executive to facilitate the synthesis in concrete action of contradictory forces, to reconcile conflicting forces, instincts, interests, conditions, positions, and ideals.
> Chester Barnard, p.21, emphasis supplied

V.   The Barnardian Organization: Individual and Executive Responsibility

We have, like Barnard, a much different conception of an organization, one which holds its employees accountable for their actions, however closely they are associated with the organizations objectives.   Following Aristotle by 2400 years and anticipating the last fifty years of evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, Barnard develops his theory of organizations around a sophisticated notion of human nature [Pinker]. 'We mean by individual a single, unique, independent, isolated, whole thing, embodying innumerable forces and materials past and present which are physical, biological and social factors' [Barnard, p.12]. Although Barnard would draw far different inferences from this individualistic conception of human nature than thinkers like Nozick and Rand, by itself it comports almost exactly with their ideas. Moreover, Barnard derives a seemingly harsh inference from his conception of human nature, one which resonates with and Rand's attitude toward the 'takers' and 'looters:'

Hence the idea of free will is inculcated in the doctrines of personal responsibility, of   moral responsibility and of legal responsibility. This seems necessary to preserve a sense   of   personal integrity. It is an induction from experience that the destruction of personal   integrity is the destruction of the power of adaptation…. Persons who have no sense of   ego, who are lacking in self-respect, who believe that what they do or think is unimportant, have no initiative whatever, are problems, pathological cases, insane, not of   this world, *unfitted for cooperation* [Barnard, p.13, emphasis original].

Barnard does not, however, agree with either Hobbes's conviction that the vast majority of human beings must be coerced or driven by poverty to work or obey the law. Ultimately, he agrees with Pinker: 'Peaceful coexistence then does not have to come from pounding selfish desires out of people. It can come from pitting some desires, the desire for safety, the benefits of cooperation, the ability to formulate and recognize universal codes of behavior, against the desire for immediate gain' [Pinker, p.169].

Let us sketch how Barnard derives human cooperation from his seminal idea of what an organization is: 'A formal organization is a *system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons* [Barnard, p.73, emphasis original]. It is important to appreciate that Barnard does not base his analysis on the suppression of human nature, which he takes as highly and properly individualistic: 'A cooperative system is incessantly dynamic, a process of continual readjustment to physical, biological, and social environments as a whole. Its purpose is the *satisfaction of individuals*, and its efficiency requires that its effect be to change the history of the environment as a whole…' [Barnard, p.59, emphasis supplied]. Note how closely Barnard comports with Aristotle's notion of the complexity of human choice:

Ethics in the Aristotelian tradition is not a separate province in which a freely willing moral agent struggles within himself in a fretful effort to do honor to or conform to a universally binding moral law or even calculate profit and loss. It is a sober reckoning, within the communal life, of policy and the whole domain of practice: goals of life and types of character they call forth both in personal development and in institutional relations, modes of decision and guidance of conduct, problems of internal conflict and ultimate reflections on well being [Edel, p.250].

The reason for this convergence of views is both simple and profound: for Aristotle, Pinker, and Barnard, the essence of being human is Reason, the foundation of informed or rational choice. This does not mean of course that all humans employ their reason properly or even frequently. It does mean that when acting *qua* human, the capacity for informed choice is available; it's on the human menu. Aristotle, Pinker and Barnard have a more complex understanding of the self than radical individualists like Nozick or Rand, so they cannot infer a monocausal or what Rand would call, an 'objectivist' appreciation of rational choice. For them it is rational to evaluate the entire existential circumstance when trying to make an informed choice. We are not driven exclusively driven by material self-interest, even when we remain rational. It is rational to make 'sacrifices' for family and friends under the strictures of 'reciprocal altruism' [Trivers].

Although Barnard does not use this term made famous by Trivers, it is incorporated in his idea of an organization:

Willingness to cooperate, positive or negative, is the expression of the net satisfactions or dissatisfactions experienced or anticipated by each individual in comparison with those experienced or anticipated through alternative opportunities…. Thus from the viewpoint of   the individual, willingness is the joint effect of personal desires and reluctances; form   the viewpoint of the organization, it is the joint effect of objective inducements offered   and   burdens   imposed.   *The measure of this net result, however, is entirely individual,   personal   and   subjective* [Barnard, pp.85-6, emphasis supplied].

Again, we must emphasize the intrinsic individualism or liberalism of Barnard's approach. To this extent, notwithstanding his more complex appreciation of the factors which induce human cooperation and their normal existential situations than radical individualists allow, he can be said to follow a relatively simple cost/benefit approach to making informed choices when in engaged in organizational activities. But this would not be correct.

To see why, it is necessary to consider one of Barnard's most original and controversial contributions to organization theory: his conception of the most important executive function. 'That which is unique to the executive functions, however, is that they impose the necessity of *creating* moral codes' [Barnard, p.274]. This idea is especially relevant to this essay, because it separates Barnard from 'objectivist' approaches:

The most generally recognized aspect of this function [creating moral codes for others] is called securing, creating, inspiring of 'morale' in the organization. This is the process of   inculcating points of view, fundamental attitudes, loyalties, to the organization…that will   result in the subordinating of individual interests…to the good of the cooperative whole [Barnard, p.279, original emphasis].

Note also that this is not 'feel good' morale boosting of 'motivationists' [Vasillopulos, 'Surprise']. Barnard aims at 'fundamental attitudes.'   Only then can individuals become 'fitted for cooperation.'   Rand, for example, believes, to the contrary, that material inducements would suffice given ego-driven self-interest. Far from separating the executive from moral concerns the Barnardian executive is immersed in them [Vasillopulos, 'Self']:

>   The chief difference between the lower and higher ranks is not in the capacity of   responsibility   but in the conditions of moral complexity…. The moral complications of   the executive functions, then, can only be endured by those possessing a commensurate   ability. While, on the one hand, the requisite ability without an adequate complex of   moralities or without a high sense of responsibility leads to the hopeless confusion of inconsistent expediencies so often described as 'incompetence;' on the other hand, the requisite morality and sense of responsibility without commensurate abilities leads to   fatal indecision or emotional and impulsive decisions, with personal breakdown and   ultimate destruction of the sense of responsibility [Barnard, pp.275-6].

This function is so critical to securing cooperation that it incorporates the idea of 'the noble lie.'

>   The invention of the constructions and fictions necessary to secure the preservation of   morale is a severe test of both responsibility and ability, for to be sound they must be 'just'   in   the   view   of   the executive, that is, really consonant with the morality of the whole; as well as acceptable, that is, really consonant with the morality of the part, of the   individual [Barnard, p.281].

>   The inculcation of moral codes has troubled many Barnard scholars, for it seems to qualify, if not destroy, Barnard's liberalism. 'Subordinate the individual' indeed! Shades of Big Brother! Barnard believes he deals with this issue by including the chief executive in the regime of domination:

>   The most important single contribution required of the executive, certainly the most   universal qualification, is loyalty, domination by the organizational personality. This is   the first necessity because the lines of communication cannot function at all unless the   personal contributions of executives will be present at the required positions, at the times   necessary, without default for ordinary personal reasons. This, as a personal qualification, is known in secular organizations as the quality of 'responsibility; in   political organizations as 'regularity;' in governmental organizations as fealty or loyalty;   in religious organizations as 'complete submission' to the faith and to the hierarchy of objective authority. The contribution of personal loyalty and submission is least   susceptible   to tangible inducements [Barnard, p.220].

>   Not only does this notion undermine the power of 'tangible inducements,' it seems to place Barnard in a totalitarian universe. Shades of *Darkness at Noon*! *Yet these fears are dramatically overdrawn, for they neglect Barnard's locus of decision, the locus of informed choice, which always remains in the brain of an individual.* Barnard, agreeing with Aristotle, believes that the essence of being human is the capacity and the desire to exercise informed choices. The organization, like the larger society, can make *claims* on an individual's cooperation, but *coercion* is always wrong and self-defeating. 'Authority always lies with him to whom it applies. Coercion creates a contrary illusion; but the use of force *ipso facto* destroys the authority postulated' [Barnard, p.183]. Consider the following: 'The individual is always the basic strategic factor in organization. Regardless of his history or his obligations he must be induced to cooperate, or there can be no cooperation' [Barnard, p.139]. And, 'The necessity of the assent of the individual to establish authority *for him* is inescapable' [Barnard, p.165, emphasis original]. And further, 'An intelligent person will deny the authority of that one which contradicts the purpose of the effort as *he* understands it [Barnard,

p.166, emphasis original]. And again, '*The point is that responsibility is the property of an individual by which whatever morality exists in him becomes effective in conduct*' [Barnard, p.267, emphasis original]. For Barnard, a command is an invitation to compliance. Authority only exists when the 'subordinate' carries out the command. Authority is an analytical concept applied by a third party observer. Coercion destroys the basis of authority and cooperation in principle. It is difficult to derive totalitarianism from such conceptions.

In contrast, let us quote Luban *et al's* final position on 'organization.'

Our approach splits the difference between the anti-reductionist and the reductionist   views   of organizations. With the antireductionists, we acknowledge that praising and   blaming organizations is not merely a shorthand way of praising or blaming individuals.   With the reductionists, however, we insist that organizations are not metaphysically   distinct seats of moral responsibility—persons or otherwise—that can absorb the blame   from individuals who 'know not what they do.' individuals alone have souls to damn, and   if the epistemological excuse relieves them of moral responsibility, then nothing in the   world is morally responsible [Luban *et al*, p. 2373].

This statement requires some analysis, for it suggests that our charge that they hypostasize 'organization' is false. They assert that an organization is not 'metaphysical.' But they qualify by saying as 'distinct seats of moral responsibility—persons or otherwise—that can absorb the blame….' This qualification, when coupled with their appreciation of organizational power, is fatal. Either an organization is or is not reducible to its human constituents. If it is not, as they have asserted, then there is a residue, yet this residue, undefined, is not sufficient to have the organization stand in for its employees as responsible for their moral shortcomings. Yet the residue is strong enough to dominate its employees. If it be strong enough to overcome the ordinary persons reluctance to do evil, then it is strong enough, one must suppose, to overcome their propensities to do evil. Moreover, it would be strong enough to make its employees serve the value set that Luban *et al* approve of. Their response, although not to the question this precisely posed, is that organizations are 'Kafkaesque' or 'SS-like.' Alternatively, the employees, by adhering to the obligations proposed by them, will 'search out evil and thwart it' without altering the organizational residue, that which exists independent of its human constituents.

We believe we have shown how 'Barnardian organization' avoids such contradictions, at least at a theoretical level. Nevertheless, we will persist in our analysis to show how a Barnardian organization may work in a complex organizational setting and further the moral responsibilities of its human constituents. In other words, we suggest ways that a Barnardian organization might overcome the limitations of positive law without having to postulate in principle dubious concepts like 'natural law.' We will do this by resuming our analysis of *Billy Budd*.

The case was such that fain would the *Indomitable's* captain have deferred taking action whatever respecting it further than to keep the foretopman prisoner till the ship rejoined the squadron and then submitting the matter to the judgment of his admiral. Herman Melville, p.348

VI.   But, What of Billy?

'What of Billy' suggests that we are about to analyze Billy's alleged crime and death sentence. Here, we are concerned with 'justice,' however, only as it impacts organizational effectiveness, either positively or negatively. In other words, a Barnardian organization would have to provide for the restraints that Luban *et al* believe necessary to avoid the 'logic' of dominating organizations, those that undermine the tendency of employees to assume moral responsibility.

> In sum, we have identified three distinct reasons that the organization must be taken seriously in our practices of fixing blame and attributing responsibility. First, the corporate structure may be a locus of events causally relevant to morally significant harm. Second, organizational culture may serve as both a causal locus for harm and an object of moral condemnation. Third, as individual's participation in organizational activity involves special risks and imposes special obligations, factors that may deepen responsibility for unintended and inadvertent wrongs [Luban *et al*, p.2377].

Can a Barnardian organization create sufficient incentives and social structures to allow for the routine operation of employee moral responsibility? Let us make clear that we are *not* undertaking an analysis of *Billy Budd* from an organizational perspective, a study which would mandate dealing with the novel *as presented*. Our analysis asks the question, 'could a Barnardian understanding of the *HMS Indomitable* have *prevented* the series of events which led to Billy's execution, by imbuing the officers and crew of the *HMS Indomitable* with moral responsibility?' We argue, although there is no way to prove the case, it could have. Furthermore, we contend that Billy's charismatic personality, his status as Handsome Sailor— would have been part of the transformation of the navy ship into a form of 'brotherhood,' that is, a group of men who are morally responsible for each other, thereby enhancing its effectiveness, not reducing it.

Let us begin by reiterating a cardinal fact: Billy was a remarkable sailor and everyone knew it. Melville amplifies this fact by stating that only Vere and Claggart *fully* appreciated it. Second, all but ignored by literary scholars, the ship's crew and officers was an organization, that is, constituted of individuals committed to common purposes under hazardous conditions: the sea itself, compounded by war. Third, Captain Vere had almost unlimited power, including the power to execute Billy, as is well understood, but also the power to exonerate him, which has seldom if ever been remarked. We must remind the reader of the cardinal distinctions between criminal innocence and moral culpability and between innocence and goodness [Williams].

Of the many scholars who defend Billy, most declare his 'innocence' and Claggart's 'evil.' If they mean that a more subtle court would have exonerated Billy, we have no quarrel with this position. We have already discussed the various iterations of Billy's crime in ascending order of exoneration or mitigation. If, these scholars hold, however, that Billy was innocent in the sense of flawlessness, they are mistaken in two related senses: Billy's physical flaw—he stuttered unintelligibly when under stress—and he responded with his fists, in the case of Claggart, fatally. Even if it be contended that Billy should not have been convicted of murder, a view with which we agree, although his trial was within the confines of due process, it is beyond question that Billy committed a wrong. He cannot be thought of as innocent of homicide, a point made clear by Vere, if overstressed and over determined. We believe, in accord with Williams, that Billy should be in some sense held 'accountable' for his propensity to violence, especially given his physical prowess, his ability to kill a man with one blow, whether intended or not or whether he was aware of his ability or not.

Our first concern is whether a Barnardian organization could have prevented this fatal series of events from occurring. Our second concern is whether such an organization would have dealt with Billy's trial differently from Vere. It must be emphasized that we are presenting an organizational analysis, not a legal one.   We are trying to find a basis for dealing with the inadequacies of positive law in an organizational context in two senses: one the limitations of the application of legal sanctions in a wide variety of human and organizational activities and two, the tendency to default inappropriately to legal sanctions, when alternatives seem unavailing. In other words, short of a totalitarian state, it is impossible, unwise, and illiberal to provide criminal sanctions for every conceivable social good or preference. And it is equally unwise to apply the criminal sanction without regard for the complexity of existential contexts. From these perspectives, we can now deal with *Billy Budd*.

We will make the easy case first: No Claggart, no evil incarnate, no malicious conspiracy to execute Billy. Billy's beneficent influence would have pervaded the warship as effectively as it had the merchant ship. But Claggart did exist and to some extent will always exist, so his malevolence will have to be dealt with in one form or another. What could have been done to thwart his efforts to eliminate Billy? It seems to us there were several opportunities to do so. Take the case of Dansker, who knew Claggart for the villain he was. He warned Billy of the danger Claggart presented to him but said nothing to anyone else, nothing to anyone superior to Claggart.   Dansker was afraid.   Only Billy's surpassing 'innocence' (we prefer 'goodness') induced Dansker to minimal and ineffectual warning. Dansker bespeaks of an atomized crew, each sailor afraid, anxious, and alone. So pervasive was this feeling that even Billy's presence or rather Billy's presence by itself could not break the shell of fear which kept the crew atomized. Pervasive fear, which cannot but undermine the cooperation necessary for the ship's effectiveness, is a decisive failure of leadership. Barnard says in so many words that coercive systems, systems which motivate with fear, are not cooperative organizations at all. The negative impact on task completion beyond the most rudimentary, to say nothing of larger organizational objectives, is obvious. Willing cooperation is essential to organizational effectiveness and efficiency [Barnard].

Despite several opportunities to call attention to Claggart's efforts to destroy Billy and thereby possibly avoid the fatal confrontation in Vere's cabin, no one notified any one equipped to look into the matter.   After the homicide, there were also several opportunities to abort the events that led to Billy's execution: (1) not convening the Drum Head and holding Billy for trial by an admiralty court. Although this suggestion was made, when brushed aside by Vere, no one followed it up. No one told Vere that they would make a report to the admiralty regarding Vere's overzealous application of command discretion. After the conviction, there were demurrals regarding the death sentence and its precipitous execution. To no avail, again no one suggested a report to higher authority. All these missed opportunities lend credence to Luban *et al's* notion of an organization at war with its 'employees' moral sensibilities. Of course many such organizations exist, but this does not depend upon the notion of an organization which cannot be reduced to its human constituents. Vere made the various decisions that led to Billy's death. His responsibility cannot be laid to the British Navy. Nor must one eliminate or significantly curtail either the 'obeying orders' defense or the 'epistemological' defense to hold Vere accountable. *Billy Budd* takes pains to emphasize Vere's intelligence, refinement, sensitivity, and character—all traits which should have enabled him to see Claggart's character as clearly as he saw Billy's. Yet, blithely ignoring their characters, Vere focused on the raw act of striking a superior and applied the death penalty. It seems to us that Vere was, for all his virtues, an incomplete man, a sum of his attributes and no core, no code with which to confront existential dilemmas. He was the antithesis of a Barnardian executive:

The leadership which reflects the attitudes and ideals of society and its general   institutions…is the aspect of individual superiority in determination, persistence,   endurance, courage; that which determines the *quality* of action; which often is most   inferred from what is *not* done, from abstention; which commands respect, reverence. It   is the aspect of leadership we commonly imply in the word 'responsibility,' the quality   which gives dependability and determination to human conduct, and foresight and   ideality to purpose [Barnard, p.260].

Billy Budd is the tragedy of Captain Vere as much as of Billy, perhaps more. For Billy was a complete man, a constant in a Heraclitian universe. Vere, 'Starry Vere,' aware of the possibilities Billy presented, abjured. He resisted Billy's influence on him and, what is worse, when confronted with the opportunity to recognize Billy's 'innocence' and Claggart's culpability, he again failed. He could have become a true leader, one who creates moral codes for his officers and crew, one who embodied the organizational code of the navy. Exonerating Billy might have transformed the officers and crew into a 'brotherhood' and transformed Vere into a Barnardian executive. Who could doubt the positive impact of such transformations on the effectiveness and efficiency of the *HMS Indomitable*? Who could doubt the benefits accruing to all? 'I believe that the expansion of cooperation and the development of the individual are mutually dependent realities, and that a due proportion or balance between them is a necessary condition of human welfare' [Barnard, p.296].

What of the officers and men? Here perhaps Luban *et al* are on stronger ground, because Vere's subordinates did not have command responsibility. Properly availing themselves of the 'obeying orders' defense, they could not be held morally or legally responsible. *In their cases, in these circumstances, under the command of this captain in this ship, in this organization,* we believe the 'obeying orders' defense would properly have exonerated the officers and men of the *HMS Indomitable*, if they had been subject to subsequent charges. This judgment, by itself, seems to make Luban *et al's* desire to disallow this defense in all circumstances, following the assumptions of the Nuremburg proceedings, untenable. As we have already indicated, these assumptions require heroic defiance of overwhelming coercive force and do so in circumstances which deny the existential complexities and torments of the events surrounding Billy and his shipmates. It is simply unrealistic to hold individuals to the standard of Ajax, Achilles, or Hector. Nor do we believe that Luban *et al's* obligations make heroism or its functional equivalent more likely. Our reason for this is that these obligations contradict the nature of the organization *as defined by them*: an entity which dominates its 'employees,' subjecting them to a variety of forces that they find nearly impossible to resist. Of what practical purpose would the 'employees' of such an organization find in a policy which approves of the obligations prescribed by Luban *et al*? Virtually all tyrannies have enlightened constitutions which declare that its citizens have a full array of rights. The US military has provisions many which echo Luban *et al's* provisions. Who among those who have served in peacetime, to say nothing of war, believe that they allow the defiance of orders without risk of ostracism or punishment? Certainly, as we have suggested, ordinary organizations, that is, those without coercive force present employees who defy them with less physical risk. Yet how many of us can live for months without a paycheck at the level to which we and our families have become accustomed? How many of us are this heroic?

What undermines the value of Luban *et al's* prescribed obligations is their misconception of 'organization.' By implicitly denying the possibility of a 'Barnardian organization,' to say nothing of defining organization in his terms, Luban *et al* fail properly to account for the existential realities of employees of organizations. Organizations, for Luban *et al*, imply a war against their essentially defenseless 'employees;' as tyrannies, organizations which create a Hobbesian world of atomized individuals, if not quite Hobbes's 'war of all against all.' In Barnard's conception this is not an organization at all. Of course

Luban *et al* are at liberty to define 'organization' in any way they see fit; so of course is Barnard. As an empirical matter there are 'organizations' that operate according in a 'Barnardian' manner and those who approximate Luban *et al's* conception. The difficulty with Luban *et al's* definition is that it must suffer from the limitations of a non-cooperative organization, that is, one that operates by intimidation.   These organizations are inefficient by definition, because the policing function they entail is expensive. In the long run, such organizations will be at a competitive disadvantage with organizations which secure cooperation with a minimum of supervision. It may seem that we a drifting into sentimentalism, we are not. Consider Darwin's views, hardly a sentimentalist:

When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if   the   one tribe included (other circumstances being equal) a greater number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other, this tribe   would without doubt succeed best and conquer the other. Selfish and contentious people   will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected [Dawson, p.199-200].

Do we need add that when two warships engage one another which one will have the advantage? Or two organizations, the Luban *et al* one versus the Barnardian?

Moreover, the more the mind of an employee is necessary for an organization to fulfill its objectives, the more complex the tasks, the more they require intricate cooperation, the less likely that coercion or the threat of coercion will work. A bitter Soviet era joke captures this idea: 'we pretend to work; they pretend to pay us.' Like society, no organization can long endure as an agglomeration of atomized units. The limitations of 'police states' followed hard upon Hobbes's *Leviathan*: 'In the last analysis, the Hobbesian conception of political power was a grossly oversimplified, even a hollow, one… [not] requiring the active enlistment of private power and support of the citizens' [Wolin, p.285]. Adapting these notions to sub-political organizations, we can say that organizations require the private consciences and the willing cooperation of their employees to operate effectively and efficiently.   Otherwise, they will mirror Harrington's verdict on *Leviathan*, a 'mere spit frog' [Wolin, p.285].

Our view is that only within a Barnardian organization could Luban *et al's* suggestions have a chance to have significant effects. Only within the context of the development of organizational codes, subject the approval of highly individualistic moral employees, who are 'fitted for cooperation,' can such organizational structures work to limit the 'logic' of 'Luban *et al* organizations.   The Barnardian organization is not the enemy *in principle* of the individual, because in Barnard's conception, it is equally liberal. It is comprised of free, moral, competent human beings. It has no separate existence, no separate logic, no separate morals, no residue beyond its human constituents. It cannot be the enemy of human values. It is just another context in which the conflicting values of free human beings are synthesized in accordance with the informed choice of the individual. Such an organization has no need to be restrained by some external conception of the 'common good' based on 'natural law.' Its conception of the common good is an algebraic addition of the individuals comprising it, individuals who always retain the right to withdraw without penalty and who retain the rights of a constitutional democracy based on natural rights.   The common good, so far from being conceived in opposition to organizational objectives or effectiveness, is defined by organizational success. Cooperation defines the essence of the organization in terms which transcend the coordination required to fulfill a complex task. It is the cooperation of free, competent, morally acute individuals. Luban *et al* pay tribute to this notion:

We now see ourselves not as individual souls, progressing from one moral episode to the next, but as members of organizations in a continuous but changing network of involvements. We now see moral encounters not simply as tests of will and virtue in the face of known and defined obstacles, but as a part of the continual effort to position ourselves in a state of clarity where knowledge and definition becomes possible [Luban *et al*, p. 2391].

Neither Aristotle not Barnard could have said it better. The differences between the Greek and Barnard on one hand and Luban *et al* on the other turn on their definitions of 'organization.' For Aristotle, thinking in terms of a political organization, a *polis*, a man cannot be a man unless he is engaged with his community in many complex undertakings [Aristotle, *Ethics*, *Politics*]. For Barnard, an organization is not necessary to be fully human, but it is necessary to complete the complex tasks that make human life possible. An organization provides an arena wherein a human being reconciles a continuous flow of conflicting values and objectives, while completing tasks that require cooperation, physical and mental. There is indeed 'organizational input,' but it is not the result of some residue left over after all the human factors are removed. It takes the form of an executive who has subordinated his ego in an effort to induce cooperation from employees in order to complete complex tasks. Unlike the Luban *et al* conception of organization, which requires its employees to defend their moral sensibilities against it, a Barnardian organization accommodates itself to the moral sensibilities of its employees, because moral responsibility is intrinsic to individuals who are 'fitted for cooperation,' without which no Barnardian organization could exist. This profound individualism is echoed by Williams: 'An important ideal that helps to shape those principles [of appropriate response] is that the individual should, so far as possible, have control over his or her life, in relation to the power of the state' [Williams, p. 66]. The hallmark of a liberal state (and its organizations) is that it does more than recognize individual freedom under a doctrine of natural rights; the liberal state and its organizations are the consequences of this conception of individual freedom. Moreover, Barnardian organizations are the consequence of the major corollary of freedom: moral responsibility. Without this underpinning of values, there can be no organizational effectiveness. Without this underpinning of values, the obligations that Luban *et al* require for the employees of an organization would have the power of a 'spit frog.'

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