

ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF ORIGINS OF DARKNESS IN AFGHANISTAN

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ABSTRACT

The Taliban are known as fundamentalist in the global and their movements have passed their capstone in the world. Although the history of origins of Taliban has been examined by numerous historians and scholars, but still obscure and poses various questions that can be further investigate and explore. In particularly, which were the fundamental factors in foundation of Taliban? What were the beliefs and ideologies in origins of Taliban? Which were the U.S foreign policy (make by U.S during Afghan-Soviet war) implications and external actor's role in origin of Taliban? To answer these questions, we will focus in the historical perspective in different stages. First of all we discuss the fundamental factors (i.e. socially, economically, politically and ethnically) caused to rise of Taliban. In second stage we will analyze the religious factors as Taliban's belief and ideologies. About the role of U.S. foreign policy during Soviet-Afghan conflict and other external actor's role in foundation of Taliban will be evaluated in third stage.

Key Words: Taliban, Ethnicity, Madrasa, Ideologies, U.S Foreign Policy, External Actors

1. Introduction

The Taliban groups have passed their high-water mark and have known as the terrorist organizations in the global. Their peace challenges in Afghanistan, sheltering to Bin Laden and Al Qaida are well known as fundamentalism. Many scholars and historians wrote a thin material on rapidly origins and come in power of Taliban but are still obscure. Various studies on origins of Taliban and terrorists are riddled through phrases describing the terrorists and Taliban as origins ‘sudden and dramatic’, ‘appearing from nowhere’, ‘from thin air’, ‘shrouded in myth’, and shrouded in mystery’.^{1.2.3.4}

To understand the truth about origins of Taliban and words dangerous terrorists, it important to focus on descriptive factors present in the Afghanistan’s condition before 1990s and U.S. foreign policies role in origins of Taliban. Certainly different studies and literatures highlight the different causes, some argues that, less advantages or disjunction in various groups (i.e. religious, social and political aspiration) for instance: In a society, when peoples feels less advantages or disjunction in various groups the little advantages or find their least and slightest advantages and benefits in society or most differentiate against group; feels inferior and eventually they become predisposed and inclined to violence and insurgency.⁵

In this imperative study we will discuss new causes in origins of Taliban particularly focusing on Afghan internal environment, belief and Ideologies, U.S foreign policy towards Afghan-Soviet war during 1979-88, external actor’s role during this war, which were major causes of violence and in organizing of mujahedin movements and at least that Afghan movements and group became so muscular and get global attention.

2. Afghan Internal Conflicts and Mujahedin Movements

History of Afghanistan has a high level of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion so some used it as “graveyard of empires” as terminology. After almost thirty five years of uninterrupted war in Afghanistan, now the narrative of Afghan is most complex web of tribal, religious, linguistic, ethnic and cohesive insecurely at local and national levels. According to Goodson, Afghanistan population is made-up different hosts like Aimaqs (10%), Hazaras (10%), Uzbeks (10%), Tajiks (25%) and Pashtuns (40-45%).⁶ The Pashtuns have been ruled the Afghanistan at about last three centuries in different stages and until last decade of twenty century. Through seventeen million populations settled at the borders of Pakistan-Afghan and these are the biggest residual tribal group and society in global.^{7.8}

Afghanistan has an important location and strong history due to his importance so British embarked the military movements to control Kabul in 1838 and anticipated for their selective leader who should prove friendship with British Government.⁹ Although, the internal tribal hostility, infringement of tribal codes and anti-Islamic situation was at top but “the Afghan peoples defeat the foreign interference and began war against the British and finally British army withdraws in 1842”.¹⁰ Again British governments carried out military campaign in Afghanistan in 1879 and controlled the Kabul in the same year.¹¹

¹ Maass, C. D. (1999). The Afghanistan Conflict: External Involvement. In *Central Asian Survey*, 18(1), (pp. 65-78).

² Kamal, M. (1999). *The Taliban Phenomenon in Afghanistan 1994-1995*. Karachi. S Oxford University Press.

³ Rashid, A. (2001). *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale University Press.

⁴ Katzman, K. (2010). *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy*. Diane Publishing.

⁵ Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford economic papers*, 56(4), (pp. 563-95).

⁶ Goodson, L. P. (2001). *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure. Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*.

⁷ Rashid, (2001). *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

⁸ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*.

⁹ Schofield, V. (2003). *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*. IB Tauris Publishers.

¹⁰ Grau, L. W. & Michael, A.G. (2002). *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Univ Pr of Kansas.

¹¹ Hyman, A. (2002). Nationalism in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34(02), (pp. 299-315).

British withdraw from Afghanistan in 1919 and further contemporary history of Afghanistan was began with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and a war was started by mujahedin against the Soviet encroachment which was covered almost a decade. In this conflict, U.S, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and some other countries support the mujahedin with funneling of billions of dollars and weapons to fight against Soviets. Finally Soviet withdrew from Afghan in 1989. After this, Najibullah (Afghan Government) backup's line dried out and was forcedly resigned in 1992. All these circumstances gave the fundamental explanations to various movements, groups and particularly to Taliban for stage stabilizing.¹² Beside, various other factors also played the key role in mobilizing of Taliban and terrorists.

2.1 Social and Economic Factors

Another main factor in foundation of Taliban in Afghanistan was worst and prevailing social and economic condition which was in result of continuing conflicts in the region. According to Tarzi study published in Asian Survey that Afghanistan had global lowest life anticipations as 42 years, Child humanity 300 out of 1000 live births which is second highest rate in the world, highest refugees difficulties in globe .i.e. 3.5 million in Pakistan and 3 million in Iran and world most horrible disability rate of population as 2 million Afghans which 1 out of 6 was disabled due to mines. Although water, electricity problems were also in Kabul and prices of routine use items (.i.e. tea, flour and rice) were also high.¹³

Violations of human rights, sexual abuses, incarceration and imprisonment, including execution and various kinds of infringements were perpetrated by the mujahedin movements groups. It was estimated that ten thousand peoples were killed in 1993.¹⁴ Jackson reported in his study that a male of Kunar area of Afghanistan stated that:

*“Three decades of conflict created a lot of problems for us. We migrated to Pakistan, our houses were destroyed, our land and property were grabbed by warlords, the economy was badly affected, our sons and daughters were deprived of education, our women were insulted...schools, hospitals, roads and factories were destroyed and fear of war has caused many mental problems.”*¹⁵

On the same report Jackson reported that a female of Kunar area of Afghanistan stated that:

*“Our request to foreigners involved in military and reconstruction activities is for them to respect Afghan culture and beliefs.”*¹⁶

Due to extensive chaos and instability, the economy of Afghanistan was huge exaggerated so the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto had begun the trade with Afghanistan to establish the economy of Afghanistan.¹⁷ But not showed the much positive results. Furthermore, the worst economic and social condition of Afghanistan was also a fundamental cause in rising of Taliban and conflicts had devastated the Afghanistan before the rising of Taliban. Not only socio-economic situation have contributed in explanation of promoting of Talibanization but ethnicity and youthfulness have also played the key role in foundation of darkness in Afghanistan.

2.2 Ethnicity and Youthfulness

Afghan's political position after the Soviet's withdraw from Afghanistan showed that the ruling party of Afghanistan (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA) was divided in different issues especially on ethnicity. It has happened first time when General Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek General)

¹². Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance*.

¹³. Tarzi, S. M. (1993). Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature. *Asian Survey*, 33(2), (pp. 165-74).

¹⁴. Maley, W. (2002). *The Afghan Wars*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹⁵. Jackson, A. (2009). *The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009*.

¹⁶. Ibid.

¹⁷. Rashid, A. (2000). *Taliban: Militant Islam. Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New Haven: Yale.

alienated from PDPA and joined Ahmed Shah Masud (Tajik Commander) after losing of northern area of Afghanistan from the government's control.¹⁸

Ethnicity diversity no doubt is a key factor of Afghanistan society. Taliban movements and leadership's striking of Pashtun dominance cannot be overlooked. Mullah Muhammad Omar (Taliban leader) and Shura members were Kandhari Pashtuns. Although in Kabul Shura mostly were Kandhari Pashtuns but with some Persian spoken, eastern Pashtuns and only one Uzbek.¹⁹ After the fall of communism government of Najibullah, the Kabul was dominated by the peoples of Hazara, Tajikistani, and Uzbekistani peoples. This was the first time in Afghan history to control the Afghanistan by Non-Pashtuns and this was very troubled for Pashtuns who were dominated on Afghanistan since three centuries.²⁰ In 1996, Afghanistan was cracked mostly huge ethnic lines: Taliban controlled on Kabul and Herat area and directly related with their relevant racially under enemy post-communist self-governing adjoining nations. Turkmani people escaped to Turkmenistan, Pathan refugees moved towards Taliban group and many non-Pashtuns joined Dostum's groups.²¹ However, before domination of Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (former Mujahedin leader), have tried to rule in Afghanistan by using ethnic card with Uzbek and Tajik but his efforts were failed.²² Beside Taliban became careful and they avoid ethnicity and Hazara people were allowed to enjoy their lives in Kabul. Finally, ethnicity distributed the Afghani peoples in different groups and movements.

Youthfulness is also a striking component in rising of Taliban and madrasa is a key element in providing of youth. Most of Taliban leaders were young and born earlier 1960. During the Taliban's movements began, Mullah Muhammad Omar (leader of Taliban) was almost 35 years old. Due to poorness and jobless, he moved to Singesar (a village of Afghanistan / Kandhar) to establish a madrasa and started to teach the religious education to Afghan students.²³ During the Afghan-Soviet war, most of students of these madras's have participated in this war because of jobless and religiously they were brainwashed.

2.3 Failed State and Malfunction

After withdraw the Russian army, the Mujahedin were divided into different groups on the base of previous cleavage and as result the civil war was started in Afghanistan because it was not possible for single group to control the worst situation. Actual governance of the country was divided among warlords and they started to earn money by demanding disgraceful levy to transporting or traveling or other kind of requirements across the territory. The United Nations (UN) try to power sharing among Afghan government and civil peoples but failed.

Ranking and indexes based on combined and aggregated points for different regions of country performance (i.e. governance, security, service delivery and economics) tend to pool states with quite dissimilar features; Afghanistan was in top 10 failed states index.²⁴ "Buffer State to a Failed State" word was also used by Rubin for Afghanistan.²⁵ 35 years of conflict and failed governance have also generated a new

¹⁸. Barfield, T. (1996). The Afghan Morass. *Current History*, 95(597), (pp. 38-43).

¹⁹. Rubin, B. R. (1999). Afghanistan under the Taliban. *Current history: A journal of contemporary world affairs*, 625, (pp .79-91).

²⁰. Tarzi, Afghanistan in 1992.

²¹. Rubin, B. R. (1997). Women and Pipelines: Afghanistan's Proxy Wars. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, (pp. 283-96).

²². Tarzi, Afghanistan in 1992.

²³. Rashid, (2001). *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

²⁴. Hansen, W. (2011). The Failed State-Organized Crime-Terrorism Nexus. http://www.Swp-Berlin.Org/En/Publications/Swp-Comments-En/Swp-Aktuelle-Details/Article/the_Failed_State_Organized_Crime_Terrorism_Nexus.Html, accessed December 31, 2011).

²⁵. Rubin, B. R. (1995). *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*. Yale University Press.

violent generation and fundamentalists, which were motivated and inspired by Islamic model of Taliban.²⁶ This failure state also opened different ways for origin of Taliban and Talibanization. According to Sebastian Mallaby:-

“Failed states are increasingly trapped in a cycle of poverty and violence. The solution is for the United States and its allies to learn to love imperialism again.”²⁷

A survey report on Afghanistan was written by Jackson that 70% Afghan peoples pointed out that poverty and joblessness are key causes of conflicts in Afghanistan and 48% stated due to ineffectiveness and corruption of the government. Some pointed out that Afghanistan is going to failing state due to other countries interfering (25%); Taliban (36%); international forces (18%); Al Qaeda (18%); shortage of support from other countries (17%); warlords (15%) and criminal grouping (14%).²⁸

2.4 Madrasas and Fundamentalism

The madrasa’s history began in 11th century from Iraq when Islamic educational system was elucidated to prepare Islamic clergy and gained religious knowledge under the madrasa of Nizam-ul-Malik. Sometime these madrasa provide financial support to families of students, higher level education and residence. Curriculums of these madrasas were prepared on the base of Dars-e-Nazami with some variation in both Pakistan and India. Madras’s education was based on Islamic law: Hadith, Tafseer, Fiqh, Sunnan and logically, some included secular subjects in the syllabus.²⁹ Various evidences showed that there are major links between certain schools inside Pakistani madrasas and militant fundamentalism.³⁰ Same as in Afghanistan, Talibanization and fundamentalism began from madrasa under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar (Taliban’s Leader).³¹ First madrasa was established in India in 19th century as alternative of west higher education. The syllabus of this madrasa was on Islam, which was emphasized Sharia and Fiqh (Islamic laws).³²

Madrasa played a fundamental role in training of mujahedin movements during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1971, only 900 madrasas were in Pakistan, but in 1988 during Zia era, madrasas were increased to 8000 registered and 25000 unregistered, where almost over half million students were getting religious education.³³ The main experience and practices by Taliban factions was madrasa education to students in Pakistani madrasas during 1980.³⁴ Similarly Rubin stated that after 1978 mostly Afghans were studying in madrasas. In that environment which was ideologically changed, they learned only Islamism, ill-discipline and were ‘supplied an outlet for the invasive population and gender wars that caused of Afghan’s social disruption.’³⁵ Most of volunteers Taliban were grew up in Pakistani refugee’s camps and unlike the earlier generation, the youth of Taliban have some knowledge and don’t know about tribal legend and lineages.³⁶

²⁶. Rashid, A. (1999). Taliban: The Exporting Extremism. *Foreign Aff*, 78, (p. 22).

²⁷. Mallaby, S. (2002). The Reluctant Imperialist-Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire. *Foreign Aff*, 81, (2).

²⁸. Jackson, The Cost of War.

²⁹. Anzar, U. (2003). Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices. *Draft Report, March*, 2003.

³⁰. Singer, P. W. (2001). *Pakistan's Madrassahs: Insuring a System of Education Not Jihad*. Brookings Institution Washington, DC.

³¹. Rashid, (2001). *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

³². Rubin, Afghanistan under the Taliban.

³³. Rashid, (2001), *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

³⁴. Dorransoro, G. (2005). *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*. Columbia University Press.

³⁵. Rubin, Afghanistan under the Taliban.

³⁶. Rashid, (2001), *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

After withdrawal of Soviet Union, Taliban went back to their madrasas to complete their religious education. However, they were not satisfied about political environment of country.³⁷ Mullah Omar (Taliban's leader) stated during an interview that "we start fighting with Muslims who are wrong. How we silent? when we saw and heard crimes against the poor, innocent and the women".³⁸

3. Religious Factors as Belief and Ideologies

General ideological situations in which buildup the violation and abuses in Afghan territory were due to local alliance and various other countries. Afghan's rigorous endeavors as well as were motivated during Soviet's encroachment which was major cause of religious war / Jihad.³⁹

Taliban's ideological bases were on their interpretation of Jihad and version of Islamic Law (Sharia). Taliban believes that there are two main groups in the world, "believers, those who follow the Taliban" and "non-believers, those who opposed the Taliban" and they are enemy of Islam. In the Taliban's vision, the criminal behavior of warlord placed them in violation of Sharia law and provided the moral power and widespread support to Taliban. The Jihad had its bases in the insurgency movements against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During 1982-92 more than 35,000 radical Muslims from 43 countries, from Africa, Middle East and Central Asia participate in Afghan Jihad.⁴⁰

Religious ideology put the belief to reproduce the socially requirements, group determinations which is actually on economically, and politically basis. Taliban policy was to infer the Sharia law unified both with the native Pashtun customary ideologies and as a latest model of Islamic society. Dorronsoro⁴¹ mentioned that due to guarantee of people's security and caring of regional peoples, Taliban get the full support from Pashtuns. But when Taliban begin to interest into other regions then clash started. Now this question arises that religious ideology of Taliban inspired them to increase political power or to gain power those leaders used it for their particular purposes. Waleed claims that to gain the political advantages some other groups joint Taliban.⁴² But Taliban continue the religious way from core so these were considered as religious ideologies movements.

Harpviken divided the Taliban's regime into two parts; the first part started from 1994 to little earlier of Kabul's control by Taliban during 1996 era, and second part, when Taliban gained power over whole of the country during 1996 era to till the United States and his allies' attack on Afghanistan during 2001.⁴³

During the era of 1994, the Taliban and Mullah Omar congregated two hundred spies and organized the Taliban's initial territorial takeover (Spin Baldak) and get the various achievements,. Taliban started to attacks on different areas of Afghanistan. Their first attack was on armaments dump and they get eighteen thousands Kalashnikovs, a number of other kinds of artillery weapons, a gigantic ammunition and also several vehicles.⁴⁴

In the same days, the Taliban's troops marched towards Kandahar and controlled within two days. This great achievement generated the influx of twenty thousand students from various madrasa (both from

³⁷. Ghufuran, N. (2001). The Taliban and the Civil War Entanglement in Afghanistan. *Asian Survey*, 41(3), (pp. 462- 87).

³⁸. Naby, R. H. (1998). *Magnus-Eden, and Ralph H Magnus. Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*. Westview Press.

³⁹. Shahrani, M. N. (1984). *Introduction: Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan*. *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, (pp. 3-57).

⁴⁰. Davis, A. (1998). How the Taliban Became a Military Force. *Fundamentalism reborn*, (pp. 43-71).

⁴¹. Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan*.

⁴². Zaid, W. (2004). How the Holy Warriors Learned to Hate.

<http://www.Nytimes.Com/2004/06/18/Opinion/How-the-Holy-Warriors-Learned-to-Hate.Html>, 'The New York Time, June 18, 2004, accessed January 28, 2014.

⁴³. Harpviken, K. B. (1997). Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan. *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(3), (pp. 271-87).

⁴⁴. Rashid, (2001), *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

Pakistan and Afghanistan) to participate in Taliban's movements.⁴⁵ By March 1995, Taliban controlled the one-third of Afghanistan and this quick achievement was through the forces amalgamation and also due to the corruption of leaders. A fresh arrival of recruits endorsed the Taliban in recovering their prime victory during 1995 in Herat. With every defeat, the Taliban's mysteriousness and professed strength propagated and they also tried to provision of justice to peoples.

Taliban's achievements were actually ideologically motivated which has been exposed by their less impressive policies and consequential administration scarcities. Furthermore, they don't have any strong agenda in administrative field and to implementation on Islamic laws.⁴⁶

At second stage, the Taliban lost their support which was basically on Sunnism, ethnicity and also depending on its assurance of restoring minds to destroy the region or picture of certainty generate by their sustained achievements to obtain the support of regional peoples. Along with complete triumph, the politically goals emerged and ambitions transferred to administration as per orders and laws of Taliban. During the 1996 era, various signs of disagreements were shown within Taliban's leaders due to their strict implementations on Islamic laws.⁴⁷ But the Taliban's government in Afghanistan was recognized by Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia and they get control almost all over the country until the United States and his allies attack on Afghanistan under the umbrella of "war on Terror" during 2001. But before the American's attack, Taliban's belief and ideologies destroyed the country's image in the global.

4. U.S. Foreign Policy and Taliban

As the Afghan's political situation was quickly deteriorated during 1979 and Soviet's gets a chance to send their forces in the battlefield of Afghanistan and tried to get their secret goals so the U.S. policy makers also started to concentration on the Soviet's goals towards Afghanistan. The U.S. tried to set up an inclusive policy to tackle the Afghan regional situation and Soviet's invasion on the country. Within this context, the purpose of this part of study is to illustrate that how U.S. makes their foreign policy towards Afghanistan with focusing on Soviet's objectives the Afghan region. And how under these policies, U.S. funneled the billions of dollars and words dangerous armaments to insurgent's movements and these policies become the key factors in risings of Taliban.

Although the two U.S policy makers, Cyrus Vance (Commander in Chief's Secretary of State) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Adviser) were agreed on the ramifications of the Soviet incursion, these both founded to each others about better dealing towards current Afghan government (backed by Soviet Union) which was ruling in Afghanistan during 1979.^{48, 49}

The importance to the differences of opinion on the direction of United States foreign policy towards Afghanistan between Brzezinski and Vance following Taraki's ascension to control are greatest understood when considering the two U.S. officials were seemingly in general agreed towards taking the action in Afghanistan before the Taraki took over following the Saur Revolution. Thomas Hammond a famous historian stated that both Vance and Brzezinski were willing to follow the policy of 'wait and see'. In an interview, during asking about public condemnations about the U.S. president towards Taraki come into government, Brzezinski replied that, "*What more could we have done?*" and also said, "*It was an internal coup with no obvious support from the Soviet Union and did not warrant American intervention.*" Furthermore, Brzezinski asserted about his recommendation for significantly unusual approach towards

⁴⁵. Ibid.

⁴⁶. Rubin, Women and Pipelines.

⁴⁷. Harpviken, Transcending Traditionalism, (pp. 271-87).

⁴⁸. Brzezinski, Z. (1983). *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*. Farrar, Straus, Giroux New York.

⁴⁹. Hammond, T. T. (1984). *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences*. Vol. 35: Westview Press Boulder, CO.

politically situation in Afghan region beside what Cyrus Vance was ready as ex- National Security Adviser no more wanted to ‘wait and see’ what should be next needed a U.S. response. However, Brzezinski began to make plans for a significantly more aggressive posture by using the Central Intelligence Agency to take-away any imminent policies towards Afghan political situation whereas the ex- State Secretary was contented about subsist America assistance given to current government in order to see where it would lead the relationship of two countries.^{50,51}

Although the U.S. embassy send information’s to their headquarter in Washington D.C and noted the Soviet’s interests within region, Cyrus Vance suggested the U.S. government to continuing their aiding to rebellions and provision of every kind of support in anticipate of limiting the Soviet’s impact on the Amin and Taraki regime.^{52,53}

Central Intelligence Agency sends the secret memorandum to Special coordination Committee (SCC) about Afghan region on March 5, 1979. Robert Gates told that the memo showed, “The freedom fighters had increased their activities against Taraki’s regime and gained unexpected achievements, which guide the government containing consequential anxiety towards growing of opposition”.⁵⁴ Gates also said that ‘Presidential Finding,’ “authorized to Central Intelligence Agency to assist the rebellions propaganda along with upgrading radio accessing under the third-world nations facilities and also funneled the half million dollars and non-military aid”.⁵⁵

In January 1998 during an interview Brzezinski admitted and stated Central Intelligence Agency’s financial support to Mujahedeen (insurgents) began during last decades of twenty century later than the Soviet’s started the Afghan’s intervention in 1979. Certainly, on July 3’ 1979 U.S. president signed the first directive for secret support to the opponents of Soviet supported regime. He also said that I wrote memo to president that the provision of financial and non-lethal support to Afghan rebellions is showing the inducement of intervention of Soviet’s forces”.⁵⁶ Shultz, the Secretary of State, said during an interview to news reporter on July 7 to Peoples Canada Daily News and proclaimed that, “This is freedom and self-determination gathering and also gathering in the name of getting Soviet Union’s military out of Afghanistan, fellow ‘freedom fighters’ we are with you”.⁵⁷

Provision of billions of dollars, every kind of arsenals and U.S. support under the umbrella of U.S. foreign policy makes the insurgent’s small movements so strong and at least play a key role in foundations of Taliban, which are now dangerous for world.

5. External Actor’s Role in Foundation of Taliban

The Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan during 1979 not only gets the attention of US but also the various countries around the global: Other illustrative doors in foundation of Taliban were external involvement in which key role actors were Saudia, Pakistan, Egype, Iran and U.S.S.R. These countries played the key role in Afghan war during 1979 era. The Soviet Union and United States of America supplied

⁵⁰. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*.

⁵¹. Vance, C. (1983). *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. Vol. 25: Simon and Schuster New York.

⁵². Vance, *Hard Choices*.

⁵³. Kaufman, S. (2008). *Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration*. Northern Illinois Univ Pr.

⁵⁴. Robert, M. G. (1996). *From the Shadows. The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. New York.

⁵⁵. Gates, *From the Shadows*.

⁵⁶. . Brzezinski’s Interview, (1998). Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2, Brzezinski’s Interview, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rgjasqjh7om&feature=Relmfu>> assessed January 10, 1998.

⁵⁷. Emadi, H. (1999). *New World Order or Disorder: Armed Struggle in Afghanistan and United States' Foreign Policy Objectives*. *Central Asian Survey*, 18(1), (pp. 49-64).

the billions of dollars and armaments to Afghan rebellions. So during 1980s era, Afghanistan was seen as the largest armaments country in the world.⁵⁸

The conflict doesn't start under the Islamic laws and orders. The anti-regime insurgencies were segregated responses over violently implemented social developments by the Khalqi regime.⁵⁹ The emerging civil conflict was moved towards holy conflict while the U.S seized to this as the CIA packages.

Forefront the main resistance was began by Afghan resistance movements against the Soviets under the U.S support with key roles playing by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egyptian, British, the Gulf States, Paris, and Chinese. Saudi Arabia matched the dollars with America's dollar in support of mujahedin movements and Russian-made weapons were supplied by Egypt.⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² ⁶³ Masses of the Type-56 assault rifle provided by China, which is a duplicate of the AK-47.

The supplying of weapons and money to insurgents were depended on Pakistan security agencies and they were guided under the umbrella of Islamic outlines of Pakistan. These security agencies provided the billions of military aiding to different groups of insurgents.⁶⁴ Pakistan also played a prime role in foundations of Taliban. Soon after the capturing of Spin Baldak by Taliban, the Pakistani officials send their convoy in Afghan region for testing purpose and that convoy was captured by Afghani military outside the Kandahar area. There were various Pakistani security officials, Taliban commanders and some ex-army drivers in the convoy. Weighing various tries, finally Pakistani administration request to Taliban's for their help. At least, Taliban successfully release the convoy and next day Taliban started their control towards Kandahar. Islamabad's foreign officials stated that in Taliban's victory, Pakistan played a key role, and there were evidences that Pakistan had succeed a Kandahar's commander to made it more painless for Taliban's control of Kandahar. But Pakistani officials continually denied to Taliban's supporting, while Babar privately get the credits of Taliban's successions and call them as "our boys."⁶⁵ Pakistani aiding to insurgents was little at initial stage in rising of Taliban. At second step, the Pakistani assistance played a prime role to control the Afghan territory by Taliban; at least, Pakistan is known as the godfather of Taliban.⁶⁶ ⁶⁷

In intensely interested situation of Afghanistan's politics, Saudi Arabia also played a prime role in that critical environment. According to a study, Gates issued a memo to the SCC, "Saudi Arabia was contemplating the ideas to appealing the U.S. for support to insurgents and they can supply financial support and encouraging to Pakistan if the United State of America would do so."⁶⁸

The government of Saudi Arabia then used its *General Intelligence Directorate* (GID) to support and giving the aid with equipment, money and other supplies to the Afghan commander who were outside the CIA and ISI's control.⁶⁹ The Saudi Arabia seeks to agreement and prevents Shia (Iranian) propose to dominance on Islamic earth by creating the powerful Sunnism in the state.⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency

⁵⁸. Rubin, B. R. (1994). Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving. *Asian Survey*, 34(2), (pp. 185-90).

⁵⁹. Huldtt, B. & Jansson, e. (1998). *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: The Social, Cultural, and Political Impact of the Soviet Invasion*. Routledge.

⁶⁰. Harclerode, P. (2002). *Fighting Dirty: The inside Story of Covert Operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden*. Cassell.

⁶¹. Cooley, J. (2002). *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*. Pluto Press.

⁶². Prados, J. (2002). Notes on the Cia's Secret War in Afghanistan. *The Journal of American History*,89(2), (pp. 466-71).

⁶³. Coll, S. (2004). *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the Cia, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. Penguin.

⁶⁴. Harpviken, K. B. (1999). *War and Change in Afghanistan: Reflections on Research Priorities*.

⁶⁵. Rashid, (2001). *Taliban: Militant Islam*.

⁶⁶. Maass, The Afghanistan Conflict, (pp. 65-78).

⁶⁷. Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War.

⁶⁸. Gates, From the Shadows.

⁶⁹. Coll, *Ghost Wars*.

⁷⁰. Carpenter, T. G. (1994). The Unintended Consequences of Afghanistan. *World Policy Journal*, 11(1), (pp. 76-87).

with the support of Saudi Arabia provided financial support and weapons approximately US\$ 6 and 9 billion to Afghan resistance against USSR.⁷¹

Egypt also played a salient part in not only providing ammo and guns to the Afghan rebellions, but they also offered a secure landing zone for U.S-supplied aid that later provided to Mujahidin. Furthermore, General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI), this Arab nation's intelligence apparatus have worked with the American CIA in a combined effort to recruit and train many of those who finally made their way onto the Afghanistan.

Sadat even talked openly about supplying weapons to the Mujahidin fighters during a publicly broadcasted interview on September 22, 1981 – just days before he was assassinated. In the open pronouncement, the Egyptian President revealed that the United States had contacted him soon after the Soviet invasion. According to his recollection, “America told him to open up his stores so that they could give the Afghanis the armaments they needed to fight.” He then answered most probably in next question, “I gave the armaments”.^{72 73 74}

The evidence supporting involvement of Iran in Afghan-Soviet conflict is sparse and somewhat contradictory amongst the writers of this feature of overall issue. Still one such report published in Iranian newspaper on 30 Jun 1980 and claimed, “At least 14 bases had been set up in Iran and over twelve hundred peoples could be trained at any one period.” The narrative further mentions a various groups by name which supported by Iran government and asserts, “Mostly Islamic Party of Afghanistan ‘Yunus Kholes’, “this counterrevolutionary group is mercenary and treacherous – and serving the United State interests”.⁷⁵ All this involvement has also played a prime role in foundations of darkness in Afghanistan.

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⁷¹. Faltas, S. & Paes, W. C. (2001). The Problem of Small Arms in Developing Countries. *Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit.*

⁷². Bradsher, H. S. & Henry, S. B. (1983). *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.* Duke University Press Durham, NC.

⁷³. Roy, O. (1990). *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.* Vol. 8: Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁴. Cooley, *Unholy Wars.*

⁷⁵. Philip, B. (1981). *Washington's Secret War against Afghanistan.* New York, Ny: International Publishers.